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ABSTRACT 
In this paper the effect of decoupling on the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into agricultural 
rents in Ireland are analysed using a dynamic rental equations estimated with a two step system GMM 
estimator that accounts for expectation error and endogenous regressors. The findings illustrate the 
importance of institutional details in determining the extent to which subsidies are capitalised. In the 
period prior to decoupling Pillar 1 subsidies were highly capitalised into Irish agricultural rents in both 
the short and the long run. Depending on the farm system considered between 58 to 80 cents per euro 
of subsidies were capitalised into agricultural rents. In the post decoupling period the rate at which 
Pillar 1 subsidies are capitalised into Irish agricultural rents is found to have declined. This change is 
likely due to short term character of the Irish agricultural land rental market, where 11 month rental 
periods predominate, and the freedom that the 2003 reform of the CAP offered farmers to consolidate 
entitlements established on rented land. The generally very short term nature of Irish agricultural 
rental contracts offered farmers an opportunity to consolidate entitlements that is unlikely to have 
arisen in other Member States with agricultural land rental markets characterised by long term 
contracts. The results in both the pre and post decoupling periods highlight the high degree of inertia 
of agricultural rents in Ireland, and the importance of accounting for dynamics when investigating the 
capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into land rents. The high degree of inertia in rents means that 
the impact of previously capitalised agricultural policy persists through time. 
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An Analysis of the Capitalisation of 
CAP Payments into Land Rental Rates 
in Ireland 
Stephen O’Neill and Kevin Hanrahan* 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 68/August 2013 
1. Introduction 
The agricultural sector in the EU, as in the US, is heavily subsidised. Appropriations 
dedicated to the Preservation and Management of Natural Resources accounted for €60.2bn 
or 39.8% of the 2013 EU budget.1 These appropriations are mainly devoted to financing the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Common Fishery Policy (CFP), with the CAP 
accounting for over 70% of spending.2 Initially, agricultural incomes were supported via 
market  supports, however the endemic over-production that resulted lead to the MacSharry 
Reforms agreed in 1992. These reforms were comprised of reductions in intervention prices 
for meat and cereals which were offset by increased direct payments. While for cereal farmers 
the direct payments were based on the area of particular crops grown, subject to set-aside 
restrictions, for livestock farmers, direct payments were based on headage subject to 
extensification criteria limiting animal densities per hectare of forage area. However, since 
these payments were linked to current production outcomes, they continued to distort 
production decisions and hence input use, as farmers sought to increase their subsidy 
receipts.  
Given the incentive to increase production and the associated increase in input use, one 
would expect upwards pressure on input prices, particularly for inputs with relatively 
inelastic supply such as land (Floyd, 1965; Hertel, 1989; Ciaian and Swinnen, 2006). This has 
important implications for the transfer efficiency of subsidies since the portion of subsidies 
that is bid into input prices is not reaching its intended recipient, lowering the transfer 
efficiency of subsidies. As a result the capitalisation of subsidies into input prices, particularly 
land prices, has attracted considerable attention in the literature (Phipps, 1984; Featherstone 
and Baker, 1987; Barnard, et al., 1997; Weersink et al., 1999; Shaik et al., 2005 inter alia). 
More recently attention has focussed on land rental rates (see for example Lence and Mishra, 
2003; Roberts et al. 2003; Kirwan, 2005, 2009).  
Concerns regarding the potential for coupled support payments to distort production and 
trade, in addition to the impending enlargement of the EU, led to the Mid-Term Review of 
the CAP (or Fischler reforms) agreed in 2003. These reforms sought to replace payments 
based on current production with payments based on past production decisions, referred to 
as ”decoupled” payments since they are no longer coupled to current production. In the EU 
and the US, decoupled payments are tied to the possession of land, although as discussed 
below the specifics differ across the two regions. To the extent that coupled subsidies are bid 
into non-land inputs, one may anticipate that a move to decoupled subsidies would increase 
land values since there is no requirement to actually produce, freeing farmers from the need 
                                                        
* Stephen O’Neill, Agricultural Economics and Farms Surveys Department, Teagasc and Department of 
Economics, National University of Ireland – Galway (NUIG). 
Kevin Hanrahan, Agricultural Economics and Farms Surveys Department, Teagasc. 
1 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/2013/2013_en.cfm accessed 1st October 2013. 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/budget/figures/interactive/index_en.cfm accessed 1st October 2013. 
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to purchase non-land inputs. The inelastic supply of land, in conjunction with the 
requirement to possess land to claim full decoupled payments, may increase the 
capitalisation of subsidies into rents. 
However, subsidies that are ostensibly decoupled from production may still influence 
production decisions, for example due to wealth and insurance effects (Hennessy, 1998; 
Rude, 2000), by improving access to credit (Vercammen, 2003) or by changing farmers’ 
labour supply (Guyomard et al., 2004). Where decoupled payments are based on historical 
production decisions, there may also be an incentive for farmers to maintain increased 
production levels if they expect the basis on which payments are made to be updated to 
include the current period at some future point in time (OECD, 2001; Westcott and Young, 
2002). Therefore decoupled payments may continue to be partially capitalised into non-land 
input prices, reducing the extent to which they are bid into land values.  
The institutional arrangements and the requirements attached to decoupled payments may 
also play a role in reducing the extent to which decoupled payments are capitalised into land 
rents. For instance, a bond scheme has been proposed (Swinbank and Tangerman (2001), 
Swinbank and Tangermann (2004)) whereby decoupled payments would not be tied to the 
possession of land (or any other input) and would be freely tradeable. Such an approach 
would be expected to greatly reduce the possible extent of capitalisation. 
This paper adds to the burgeoning literature on capitalisation of subsidies into land rents by 
exploring the extent to which coupled and decoupled subsidy payments have been capitalised 
into land rental rates in Ireland using panel data from the Teagasc National Farm Survey for 
the years 2000 to 2009 encompassing both the period preceding the move to decoupled 
payments and the four years after their introduction. In Ireland, the vast majority of farms 
rent land under the conacre system which consists of short term loans, usually of 11 months 
duration (Patton et al., 2008; O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2012). Thus rental contracts are 
renegotiated regularly implying that the effects of policy changes on rents should be more 
apparent in Ireland than in countries where multi-year contracts are prevalent. As discussed 
below, as part of the Fischler reforms, farms are allowed to transfer, or consolidate, subsidies 
from land where rental contracts have expired to other rented or owned land. Given the 
prevalence of short term contracts in Ireland, many farms had the option of consolidating 
their entitlements and hence we anticipate that capitalisation should be low in Ireland 
compared to other EU countries. In essence, many farmers in Ireland are in a position to 
`escape’ from situations where significant portions of their subsidies are being captured by 
landowners by consolidating their entitlements. Combined with the tradability of 
entitlements, consolidation moves the decoupled SPS payment in Ireland in the direction of  
a bond scheme and would be expected to increase the transfer efficiency of the decoupled 
subsidies. Thus if coupled payments were heavily capitalised into rents, a decline in rents is 
anticipated. 
However, previous research, focussing on the area rented, has revealed considerable inertia 
in the rental decisions of Irish farmers (O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2012). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests similar inertia exists in rent-setting leading to uncertainty as to whether 
consolidation will lead to changes in land rents following the introduction of decoupled 
payments. Hence, the extent of decoupling is an empirical question. To account for inertia, 
we estimate a dynamic linear model for land rents using a System GMM approach (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). Our findings suggest 
that coupled subsidies for dairy, sheep and tillage farms are capitalised into land values with 
77 cents, 67 cents and 90 cents of each euro of support being bid into rents respectively in the 
long run. For cattle farms the point estimate suggests 54 cents per euro of support is bid into 
rents although this is not statistically different to zero. Following the Fischler reform, there is 
a reduction in the extent of capitalisation for dairy (41 cents) and tillage (53 cents) farms. The 
point estimate for cattle farms decreases to 21 cents and becomes statistically significant 
while, for sheep farms, the point estimate reduces to 35 cents although this is not statistically 
different to zero. 
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This research has important policy implications since the greater the incidence of subsidies 
on rents, the less of the subsidy that reaches the targeted recipient and hence the less impact 
the policy has on the farm incomes of this group. Indeed, to the extent that land is owned by 
non-farmers or farmers engaged in unsupported production types, the subsidy may not even 
reach the intended sector. Even within the supported sector, the incidence of the subsidy is 
likely to lie disproportionately with farms of larger agricultural area that would be in a 
position to rent-out land if the payments are heavily capitalised into agricultural land rents. 
Furthermore, since land is a fundamental requirement for agricultural production to occur, 
increased land rents/prices may represent significant barriers to entry into the agricultural 
sector and may also impede restructuring within the sector (Karlsson and Nilsson, 2013). 
This final consideration is likely to be very important in an Irish context as a very low 
proportion of agricultural land is transacted on an annual basis, and the principal route 
through which structural change in Irish agriculture is likely to occur is via the agricultural 
land rental market. 
The paper is organised as follows: we next provide the context to this study, then discuss the 
methodology employed and introduce the dataset used before discussing our results and 
presenting some conclusions. 
2. Background 
Most of the existing literature on the capitalisation of subsidies into rental rates has been 
carried out using data from the US, although more recently this topic has garnered attention 
in a European context also (Patton, Kostov, McErlean and Moss, 2008; Breustedt and 
Habermann, 2011; Ciaian, Kancs and Michalek, 2011; Ciaian and Kancs, 2012).3 Before 
discussing the literature on capitalisation of subsidies, it is instructive to give a broad 
overview of the policy context underlying subsidy regimes in the US and EU in the periods 
considered.4 
2.1 United States 
In the US, prior to the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act in 1996, 
farms received counter-cyclical subsidies called deficiency payments which depended on 
historical crop yields, the eligible area devoted to each crop and a set of payment rates which 
were based on the difference between the target price and the national average price received 
for each crop. The FAIR Act removed the link between these income support payments and 
production, through the introduction of Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) payments 
which are independent of the types, quantities and the market prices of crops grown 
(Guyomard, Bureau, Gohin and Le Mouël, 2000). The PFC payments were tied to specific 
plots of land and therefore land transfers directly resulted in transfers of subsidies between 
farms. This contrasts with the situation in the EU, where the farmer must obtain a specified 
number of eligible hectares to claim full payments, but there is no stipulation that the 
particular hectares declared be the same in each period. The PFC payments were introduced 
during a period of high output prices which were envisioned to continue. However, this 
proved not to be the case and the Market Loss Assistance (MLA) programme was introduced 
to compensate farms for low commodity prices. These payments were substantial, amounting 
to approximately 50% of the amount of PFCs in 1998 and 100% in 1999 and 2000 (Childs, 
2001). The MLA payments were also decoupled from production since they were based on 
base acreage regardless of whether particular crops were currently being grown on the land. 
                                                        
3 Latruffe and Le Mouël (2009) provide a detailed review of the literature concerned with 
capitalization of government subsidies in land prices and rental rates. 
4 Our discussion of the US system of subsidies draws from Kirwan (2005) and the other cited US 
studies. 
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In addition to the PFC and MLA payments, farms were also eligible for Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) payments which were paid to landowners in exchange for removing erodible 
cropland from production (Sumner, 2007) and Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) which are 
payments to farms that occur when the world price falls below the loan rate for particular 
crops including wheat, feed grain, upland cotton, rice and oilseeds (Childs, 2001). 
In the US, farm bills are introduced every 5 to 7 years and so the Farm Security and Rural 
Investment (FSRI) Act of 2002 was introduced to succeed the FAIR Act. The FSRI Act 
introduced Counter-Cyclical Payments (CCPs) to replace the ad-hoc MLA payment and, more 
significantly, allowed producers to update their historical acreage and yield information on 
which PFC payments were made according to planting during the post-1996 periods.5  
In the context of the FAIR Act, Lence and Mishra (2003) explore the impact of the PFC 
payments, MLA, CRP payments and LDP on cash rental rates for farmland in Iowa and find 
that MLA and PFC payments, which are decoupled from production, are almost completely 
bid into land rents. On the other hand, Lence and Mishra find that CRP payments are not 
capitalised into rents. Surprisingly, Lence and Mishra find that deficiency payments and 
payments linked to price support programs are associated with lower rents. Their results also 
suggest that market revenues are bid into land rents. An important consideration when 
estimating the extent to which subsidies are bid into land rents is the fact that rents are 
generally set prior to the realisation of market returns and, in some cases, subsidies giving 
rise to expectation error which potentially biases estimates (this issue is discussed in detail in 
the Methodology section below). Lence and Mishra use lagged realisations of the explanatory 
variables within a GMM estimation approach to over come this potential source of bias.  
Roberts, Kirwan and Hopkins (2003) conduct a similar analysis to that of Lence and Mishra 
using Census of Agriculture data for the US. PFC payments in 1997 were known in advance 
removing the possibility of expectation error and this allows the effect of PFC payments to be 
identified in 1997 and also in 1992 (where 1997 values are used to instrument those of 1992). 
The strongest estimates in Roberts et al. are obtained using instrumental variable (IV) 
regression on the change in rents and change in government payments between 1992 and 
1997. Their results suggest that between 34 and 41 cents per dollar of government subsidies 
are bid into land rents, substantially lower than the figures reported by Lence and Mishra for 
Iowa. 
Kirwan (2009) explores capitalisation of subsidies within the US using 3 approaches. Firstly 
he uses data from the US Census of Agriculture to estimate that 20-25 cents per marginal 
subsidy dollar is capitalised into land rents, and hence captured by landowners, while 70-75 
cents per dollar is captured by the tenants by modelling tenants’ net returns in place of rental 
rates. Kirwan goes on to explores the extent to which capitalisation differs across regions and 
finds that in some regions landowners do not appear to capture any of the subsidies, while in 
the other regions between approximately 17 and 48 cents per dollar of subsidies is capitalised 
into agricultural land rents. Next, Kirwan augments the Census of Agriculture data with data 
from the 1999 Agricultural Economics and Land Ownership Survey (AELOS), to explore the 
capitalisation of subsidies following the introduction of the unanticipated MLA payments, 
and finds that 34 cents per dollar are bid into rents. Finally, by adding data from the 2006 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), Kirwan explores capitalisation between 
1997 and 2006, finding that 26 cents of subsidies were capitalised during this period, which 
includes 4 years after the introduction of the FSRI Act.  
In contrast to the preceding studies which consider farm level average per acre rents and 
average subsidies per acre, Kirwan and Roberts (2010) use field level data from the USDA’s 
Agricultural and Resource Management Survey (ARMS) Phase II survey conducted in 
2006and find that between 14 and 24 cents of the marginal subsidy dollar are bid into land 
rents. 
                                                        
5 The reader is referred to Sumner (2003) and Kirwan (2009) for a detailed discussion of the changes 
introduced under the FSRI Act. 
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In the US, a significant minority of farms rent land under crop-sharing contracts rather than 
cash rental contracts. The Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data provides 
information regarding the type of rental contract which Qiu, Gervais and Goodwin (2010) use 
to estimate that landlords capture approximately 38% of total subsidies under cash leases 
compared with approximately 86% under crop-share contracts. In contrast to the studies 
previously cited which adopted IV approaches to deal with measurement error in the 
subsidies, Qiu et al. proxy expected subsidies and expected net market earnings using five-
year county average values.  
Woodard, Paulson, Baylis and Woodard (2010) estimate a spatial hedonic model for Illinois 
cash rents using panel data from the Illinois Farm Bureau Farm Management (FBFM) 
Association for 1996 to 2008. Their results for the entire period suggest capitalisation of 27 
cents per dollar but when the sample is divided into pre and post the 2002 FRSI, 
capitalisation is found to be only 8 cents pre-FSRI and 47 cents post-FSRI. While Woodard et 
al. argue that this is not unexpected given the greater predictability of government subsidies 
under the FSRI farm bill, it does raise questions given the expectation that FSRI Act would 
reduce the extent to which subsidies to US agriculture were coupled to production. 
Hendricks, Janzen and Dhuyvetter (2012) use a panel dataset of Kansas farmers from 1990 to 
2008 to estimate a dynamic rental equation to account for inertia using System GMM (as in 
this paper). They find that the coefficient of lagged rent is 0.675, indicative of considerable 
inertia in rental rates. The short run capitalisation of subsidies is estimated to be 7 cents per 
dollar before correcting for the share of rented land that is based on share-cropping 
contracts, although this is found not to be statistically significantly different from 0. After 
adjusting the dependent variable to account for the type of rental contract (cash versus share-
cropping) the short-run (long run) capitalisation of subsidies into agricultural rents increases 
to 12 cents (37 cents) per dollar of subsidies. 
2.2 European Union 
Since the Treaty of Rome (1957), EU farmers have received income support under the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Initially, as in the US, these payments took the form of 
price supports, however following the MacSharry Reforms, which were agreed in 1992, 
support shifted towards direct income support payments based on area planted and the 
number of livestock farmed. Due in part to concerns regarding the production distorting 
effects of such payments, the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) was introduced in 2005 
following the Fischler reforms to CAP agreed in 2003.  
The SPS involves direct payments based on production during the reference period 2000-
2002. Decoupling direct income support from current production activities, it is claimed, 
removes the policy based incentives faced by farmers to alter current production decisions. 
Thus these payments were decoupled from production in a similar manner to the PFC 
payments in the US. One important distinction, is that while PFC payments in the US were 
tied to specific plots of land, in the EU SPS farmers must be in possession of a specified 
number of hectares to obtain a full payment, but importantly there is no requirement that the 
farmed area comprise of the same parcels in each period. Hence, under the SPS farmers in 
the EU have greater flexibility to trade land (e.g. via land rental markets) while maintaining 
their SPS payment. We would therefore a priori expect that capitalisation would be lower in 
the EU than in the US. However, since a requirement to possess a specific amount of land 
based on the area farmed during the reference period would have created serious problems 
for farmers whose rental agreements had expired, an option to ”consolidate” entitlements 
was offered (DAF, 2004). The consolidation option meant that farmers whose land rental 
agreements had expired could effectively transfer payments from areas which they no longer 
rented to land which they still possessed.6 These farmers are then required to maintain an 
                                                        
6 Under the consolidation option farmers with entitlement established in part or in full on rented-in 
land could reduce the area used to claim their entitlement by a maximum of 50%. The value of each 
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area equal to the portion of their declared land for which the rental agreements had not 
expired. The farmers that have exercised the consolidation option may effectively no longer 
have a requirement to rent-in land to satisfy the SPS land requirement or at least have a 
reduced demand for rented in land. Hence the land requirement is less binding in Ireland 
than in other European countries due to the ”conacre” system of short term land rental 
agreements in operation.  
Under the SPS, EU Member States had a number of options for how the scheme would be 
implemented, with most countries including Ireland, Scotland and Wales, adopting the 
historic approach whereby payments were farm-specific, based on production decisions 
during the reference period (2000-2002). Other countries, such as England and Germany 
adopted what is known as a dynamic hybrid model under which the payment model 
transitioned over time from a mixture of a flat are payment and a historically determined 
payment to a regional flat area payment whereby all farms within a region receive an equal 
payment per hectare. Other countries, including Northern Ireland and Sweden, adopted a 
static hybrid model wherein the payment received is a mixture of a historically determined 
and a flat area payment with no further transition towards a flat area payment model.7 
Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (with the exception of Malta and 
Slovenia who operate under the SPS) were allocated payments under the separate Single Area 
Payment Scheme (SAPS) which consisted of flat rate per hectare payments applied to all 
farms.  
The capitalisation of CAP payments into European land rents has received relatively little 
attention until quite recently. Early work in this area was conducted by Fuchs (2002), who 
aggregates Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) data for specialist crop farms to 
regional levels for 53 regions in the EU for the years 1989-1999 and estimates that 
approximately 7 cents per additional euro of subsidies is bid into rents. Patton, Kostov, 
McErlean and Moss (2008) explore the capitalisation of the pre-Fischler reform payments 
into land rents in Northern Ireland using data from the Farm Business Survey from 1994 to 
2002. Rental contracts in Northern Ireland are also based on the ‘conacre’ system. Patton et 
al. (2008) find that coupled subsidies such as special beef premium (41 pence per £1 of 
subsidies) and suckler cow premium (42 pence per £1 of subsidies) are heavily capitalised 
into agricultural land rents, while the ewe premium is fully capitalised into land rents. The 
greater capitalisation of sheep payments is attributed to the fact that sheep production 
requires few inputs besides land, limiting the extent to which other factors of production 
capture these subsidies. Hill-livestock compensation allowance (58 pence per £1 of subsidies) 
and less favoured area payments (£1.20 per 1£ of subsidies) are also found to be bid into 
rents. Patton et al. find that while dairy net returns are bid into land rents, this is not the case 
for net returns to cattle and sheep– with a negative, though statistically insignificant, 
relationship found to exist between these returns and land rents found.  
Using data for the German federal state of Lower Saxony in 2001, Breustedt and Habermann 
(2011) estimate a spatial econometric model for rents, and find that a one euro increase in 
rental rates in a farm’s neighbourhood increases the farm’s rents by 72 cents. They explore 
the incidence of EU per-hectare payments for eligible arable crop land and find that an 
additional euro of premium payments increases rents by 38 cents.  
Ciaian, Kancs and Michalek (2011) raise a number of issues with previous regression based 
approaches to estimating the capitalisation of subsidies into rents, issues identified include 
selection bias due to payments being based on farmers’ past management choices, 
endogeneity due to unobserved factors such as productivity influencing rents and the SPS 
                                                                                                                                                                             
entitlement (€/ha) is increased following consolidation so that total farmer receipts from the SPS were 
unaffected. 
7 The full set of implementation approaches taken by each country is provided in European 
Commission (2012). The distinction between the various systems is elaborated on by Swinbank et al. 
(2004) and Kroll (2008). 
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payments, and the inability of many of the approaches employed in the literature to capture 
general equilibrium effects whereby subsidies to agriculture put upwards pressure on all 
rental rates even for farms that have not rented land. Ciaian et al. apply a generalized 
propensity score matching estimator to a balanced panel of FADN data for the EU-15 from 
2004 to 2007. They find that the extent of capitalisation depends on the level of SPS per 
hectare, with higher SPS being less capitalised into agricultural land rents. The extent of 
capitalisation found by Ciaian et al. also varies across countries ranging from 2 percent in 
Denmark and Greece to 11 percent in Spain when averaged across all farms, although 
capitalisation also varies within countries across different farm sizes. Their results for Ireland 
suggest that for all farms, only 5 percent of the SPS payment is capitalised into rents and that 
the degree of capitalisation is fairly constant across different farm sizes in Ireland at 4 
percent for farms below 10 hectares and 5 percent for farms above 10 hectares. 
Ciaian and Kancs (2012) explore the capitalisation of SAPS payments into land rents in the 
new EU Member States using FADN data for 2004 and 2005.8 A first-difference estimator is 
used to remove the effects of time invariant omitted variables and selection bias is controlled 
for by including the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) based on a probit model for whether the farm 
rents land. They find that between 18 and 20 cents per euro of SAPS payments are bid into 
land rents and that selection bias does not appear to be an issue since the coefficient on the 
IMR variable is statistically insignificant. 
Moro, Guastella, Sckokai and Veneziani (2013) use FADN data for field cropping farms in 
Italy for the years 1994 to 2008 to explore the extent of the capitalisation of agricultural 
subsidies into agricultural land rents pre- and post-decoupling. They apply an estimation 
approach proposed by Wooldridge (1995) that allows for selection bias in panel data, and an 
extension by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) that allows for endogenous explanatory 
variables. This estimation strategy involves, in its first stage, estimating probit equations for 
the decision to rent land separately for each year with the explanatory variables from the 
rental equation, some variable(s) which influence whether a farm rents but do not influence 
how much rent is paid and a set of instruments for the endogenous variables. In the second 
stage, a pooled instrumental variable regression is used to estimate the effects of the 
explanatory variables on rents with the IMRs from the first stage’s probit models included as 
covariates to control for selection effects. It should be noted that this approach is suitable 
only for static panels. Moro et al. find that by using an estimation strategy that ignores 
endogeneity a significant negative effect for coupled subsidies and an insignificant effect for 
decoupled payments. However, using the approach of Semykina and Wooldridge in which the 
impact of endogenous explanatory variables is accounted, Moro et al. find that neither the 
coupled or decoupled subsidies exert a significant effect on agricultural land rents. 
The foregoing review of the literature examining the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies 
into agricultural land rents reveals significant variability both in terms of the estimated 
influence of government subsidies on rental rates and in the methodologies that have been 
employed to date. Amongst the issues potentially facing the econometrician when trying to 
establish the degree of capitalisation of subsidies into rents are spatial correlation9, inertia 
requiring the use of dynamic models, endogeneity due to expectation error and/or selection 
bias. While methods exist to simultaneously deal with a number of these problems, no model 
is a panacea. We next discuss the empirical approach taken in this paper. 
                                                        
8 The new Member States are Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia. 
9 Accounting for spatial correlation requires the availability of information regarding farms geographic 
location which unavailable in this study. Authors such as Lence and Mishra (2003), Breustedt and 
Habermann (2011) and Karlsson and Nilsson (2013) did not face this limitation. 
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3. Methodology  
The canonical approach to estimating the capitalisation of subsidies assumes that the rental 
rate per hectare paid by farm i in period t (Rit) can be expressed as a function of expected 
market-based returns (Mit) and the expected levels of the various government subsidies (Git) 
 ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܧሾܯ௜௧ሿ ൅ ߱ܧሾܩ௜௧ሿ [1] 
As discussed by Hendricks et al. (2012), the rental rate paid by a farmer in a particular year 
may in part depend on the rental rate paid by the farmer in the previous period – this is 
particularly likely where land is rented for periods in excess of a year. While the system of 
agricultural land rental in Ireland is predominantly short term `conacre’ rentals, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that there is considerable inertia in rent setting by farmers in Ireland. 
Furthermore, allowing for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity (μi) and including a 
random error term leads to the econometric model in [2]: 
 ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߛܴ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߚܧሾܯ௜௧ሿ ൅ ߱ܧሾܩ௜௧ሿ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ [2] 
The long run effect of net market returns and government subsidies are given by 
ఉ
ሺଵିఊሻ
 and 
ఠ
ሺଵିఊሻ
 respectively (Hendricks et al., 2012)). Since the farmers’ expectations regarding market 
returns and subsidies are in general unobserved, in the literature it is common to use realised 
values in place of expectations, while allowing for the fact that this introduces expectation 
error, which is akin to measurement error. The expectation error associated with market 
returns is denoted εM, while the expectation error for government subsidies is denote εG. 
Equation 2 can be re-written: 
 ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߛܴ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߚܯ௜௧ ൅ ߱ܩ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߝ௜௧ െ ߚߝ௜௧
ெ െ ߱ߝ௜௧
ீ  
 ൌ ߛܴ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ ൅ ߚܯ௜௧ ൅ ߱ܩ௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߭௜௧ [3] 
The estimation of equation [3] will lead to a bias in the estimated coefficients. To see this, 
consider two identical farmers, A and B with similar expectations regarding their income per 
hectare so that they should be willing to pay the same rental rate (RA=RB). If farmer A’s 
realised market return is greater than expected, then MA > MB but RA=RB. The 
econometrician would base estimates on the effect of income on rents on the variation of 
realised income (MA - MB) rather than the variation in expected income which is 0 in this 
example. Mathematically, we can express this bias as: 
݌݈݅݉ ߚመ ൌ ௖௢௩ሺோ೔೟,ெ೔೟ሻ
௩௔௥ሺெ೔೟ሻ
ൌ ௩௔௥ሺா
ሺெ೔೟ሻሻ
௩௔௥൫ாሺெ೔೟ሻሻା௩௔௥ሺఌ೔೟
ಾ൯
ߚ. A similar bias may exist where government 
subsidies are not known with certainty when rents are being determined. 
A number of approaches could be applied to overcome this expectation error bias. Firstly, one 
could seek a variable that captures expectations directly (e.g. Kirwan and Roberts, 2010). 
Secondly, if one knows the extent of expectation bias from some other source, then an 
adjustment to the realised variable could be made. A third approach, and that which is taken 
in this paper (as well as much of the recent literature), is to use an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach whereby variables that are correlated with realised returns but are not correlated 
with the expectation error are used as instruments for the realised values (Roberts et al., 
2003; Lence and Mishra, 2003; Hendricks et al., 2012 and Patton et al., 2008 inter alia). 
Expectation error is not the only complication that arises when using estimates of equation 
[3] to identify the capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into rental rates. Unobserved 
heterogeneity, if ignored, will result in serial correlation, since μi is time invariant and 
unobserved, and will also bias the estimated coefficients if μi is correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Furthermore, correlation between the lag (Rit-1) and μi will lead ߛ to be 
overestimated in an OLS regression and will cause standard errors to be inconsistent 
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(Arellano and Bond, 1991). On the other hand Nickell (1981) shows that the within 
transformation (or LSDV estimator) also leads to bias in this context.10 One approach to deal 
with this problem is to transform the data by differencing or using forward orthogonal 
deviations (Arellano and Bover, 1995) to remove the μi.11 Differencing the data, we obtain the 
following model:  
 ∆ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߛ∆ܴ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ∆ܧܯ௜௧ ൅ ߱∆ܩ௜௧ ൅ ∆ߥ௜௧ [4] 
However ∆ܴ௜௧ିଵ (= Rit-1 - Rit-2) is correlated with ∆ߥ௜௧ ൌ ߥ௜௧ െ ߥ௜௧ିଵ, since Rit-1 is a function of 
ߥ௜௧ , meaning that OLS on first-differences is not consistent – essentially differencing the data 
has introduced endogeneity. A standard approach to dealing with endogeneity is to use 
instrumental variables for the endogenous variable, ∆ܴ௜௧ିଵ in this case (Anderson and Hsiao, 
1981).12 Valid instruments may include ∆ܴ௜௧ିଶ and ܴ௜௧ିଶ since neither is directly related to  ߥ௜௧ 
or  ߥ௜௧ିଵ and hence to  ∆ߥ௜௧. Further lags of R (i.e. “levels”) and ∆R (i.e. “differences”) would 
also be suitable instruments. Although this approach provides a consistent estimate of ߛ, a 
disadvantage of using a standard IV regression approach is that each additional lag that is 
used reduces the sample on which the model may be ran by 1 year. In short panels this may 
represent a considerable loss of information.  
As proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991), within 
a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) framework, we can solve this problem of 
information loss by varying the number of lags used as instruments depending on the period 
being instrumented, increasing the number of available instruments. GMM allows us to find 
the optimal weighting of these instruments. For example for an observation in year 3, we can 
use Ri1 as a valid instrument for ∆ܴ௜ଶ, for year 4 we can use Ri1 and Ri2 as instruments for ∆ܴ௜ଷ 
and for year t we can use Ri1, … ,  Rit-2 as instruments for ∆ܴ௜௧ିଵ.13 Using levels of the 
endogenous variables as instruments for their differences is known as “difference GMM”.  
Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that levels of the variable are poor instruments for 
differences when the series is highly persistent and that considerable efficiency gains can be 
achieved by using lagged differences as instruments in the levels equation, with larger gains 
in precision when ߛ is higher. The estimator which takes advantage of these additional 
moment conditions is known as the system GMM estimator.14  
In one-step GMM an arbitrary choice is made about the variance-covariance matrix for the 
errors (ߗ), e.g. homoskedasticity, providing a consistent estimator of β. In two-step GMM the 
residuals can be obtained using the one-step estimator and are used to estimate the variance-
covariance matrix (ߗ෠ఉభ). The two-step GMM estimator is thus: 
ߚመ ൌ ቀܺ′ܼ൫ܼ′ߗ෠ఉభܼ൯
ିଵ
ܼ′ܺቁ
ିଵ
ቀܺ′ܼ൫ܼ′ߗ෠ఉభܼ൯
ିଵ
ܼ′ܻቁ 
Where X is a matrix of explanatory variables, Z is a matrix of instruments and Y is a vector of 
containing the dependent variable for each individual. This two-step estimator suffers from 
downward bias in the standard errors, however Windmeijer (2005) suggests a correction to 
                                                        
10 Whilst estimating [2] using OLS offers an upper bound estimate for γ, the within  (i.e. fixed effects) 
estimator tends to underestimate γ (in short panels) offering some guidance for where the true value 
should lie (Bond, 2002). 
11 Demeaning the data would also remove μi. However this is unattractive since the demeaned error 
term would be correlated with lags of the explanatory variable. 
12 Market income and government subsidies are also instrumented as discussed later in the paper. 
13 Since the number of instruments is quadratic in T, instrument proliferation is a concern, since the 
endogenous variable may be over-fitted, so that the endogeneity remains (Roodman, 2009). 
14 This approach requires an additional assumption that the change in rents is not correlated with 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (μi) 
10 | O’NEILL & HANRAHAN 
 
reduce this small-sample bias. Roodman (2009) recommends that time dummies are 
included to allow for universal period-specific shocks which may violate the assumption that 
errors are correlated only within individuals and not across them. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
developed a test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors in the differenced equation. 
While first order autocorrelation is likely to be present by construction since Δߥ௜௧ and Δߥ௜௧ିଵ 
both include ߥ௜௧ିଵ, higher order serial correlation would render some lags invalid as 
instruments. Sargan (1958) offers a means to test the exogeneity of the chosen instruments if 
the model is over-identified and the errors are assumed to be homoskedastic.15 Hansen 
(1982) generalises this test to allow for heteroskedastic errors, although these tests are weak 
when many instruments are used so a degree of caution is required.  
Two further statistical issues warrant discussion. Firstly, the Teagasc NFS does not geo-code 
farms so it is not possible to explore spatial correlation. Secondly, there is the potential for 
selection bias whereby factors which influence whether a farm rents land also influence the 
farms market income and/or subsidy receipts. While Moro et al. (2013) use an approach 
developed by Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) to deal with selection bias and endogeneity, 
this approach is only valid for static panels and hence is not pursued here.16  Moro et al. do 
not report whether the Inverse Mills Ratio in their model is significant which would indicate 
the presence of selection bias, however, Ciaian and Kancs (2012) do not find evidence of 
selection bias in their model which offers some reassurance in this regards. Nevertheless the 
inability to control for the possibility of selection bias is a limitation of this study. 
4. Data 
Each year, the Teagasc National Farm Survey (NFS) of approximately 1,200 Irish farmers is 
conducted.17 The survey data is nationally representative of Irish dairy, cattle, sheep and 
tillage farmers. Although the Teagasc NFS does not contain data on the rental rate paid for 
particular parcels of land, it does contain information on the total amount of rent paid and 
the total area rented in, allowing the calculation of an average rental rate per hectare rented-
in. Ideally the dataset would contain information on market returns and subsidies specific to 
the area rented in, however such detailed data are not available. Facing similar data 
shortcomings, authors including Ciaian and Kancs (2012) use average values per hectare 
farmed in place of average values per hectare rented and we do likewise.. In Ireland it is not 
uncommon for farmers to rent land from family members for nominal amounts. We 
therefore exclude rents of less than 20 euro per hectare which are considered to be unreliable 
reflections of the true rental cost of land (n=45). A small number of farms report implausibly 
high subsidies or market incomes per hectare (e.g. 2000 euro per hectare) which would bias 
results so, in order to prevent this bias, we remove a small number of farms that report values 
greater than 3 standard deviation from the mean for any of the key explanatory variables or 
rent per hectare (n=103). 
Since we anticipate differences in the extent of capitalisation depending on whether subsidies 
are coupled or decoupled from production we separate subsidies into Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 
payments. Prior to 2005, Pillar 1 subsidies were coupled to production, while post-2005 
these subsidies were replaced with the SPS and hence were decoupled from production. Pillar 
2 payments are intended to support rural development and environmental protection and 
place limitations on the activities farms can pursue, hence while they are not considered to be 
coupled to production in that payment levels do not depend on production they may 
                                                        
15 The use of multiple lags as instruments means that in GMM models are generally over-identified. 
16 Although Semykina and Wooldridge (2013) have also advanced an approach to deal with selection 
bias in a dynamic panel context, their approach is not valid when the explanatory variables are 
endogenous as is the case here. The authors thank Professor Semykina for helpful comments regarding 
this point. 
17 The Teagasc NFS is part of the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) of the European Union 
(EU). 
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nonetheless influence production decisions since they may constrain the intensity of the 
agricultural activities practiced. We estimate the model separately for the pre-decoupling and 
post-decoupling periods using an unbalanced panel of 10,890 observations for 2,082 farms. 
Figures A1 to A3 in the appendix illustrates the distribution of the key explanatory variables 
for each system by year, while Figures A4 to A6 illustrates the considerable inertia that exists 
for these variables also.  
5. Results 
Figure 1 illustrates that the average rental rate per hectare of agricultural land as recorded by 
the Teagasc NFS has declined substantially in the years immediately preceding the shift to 
decoupled payments in 2005 but that rents over the period 2005 to 2008 have remained 
relatively constant. Average rents per hectare paid by dairy farms and tillage farms are higher 
than those paid by cattle and sheep farms which reflects important differences in the average 
quality of land farmed in the different farming systems, with land farmed by tillage and dairy 
farms on average of superior quality than that farmed by the average cattle and sheep farm.  
It should be noted that, dairy and cattle are the most popular systems in Ireland with 
approximately 36% of the farms within the Teagasc National Farm Survey’s sampling frame 
engaged in dairy production, while 43% of farms are engaged in cattle rearing, 13% in rearing 
sheep and 7% of farms are tillage farms.  
Figure 1. Average rent per hectare by farm system 
 
Source: Teagasc NFS. 
In Ireland dairy and tillage farms tend to be more profitable than sheep and cattle farms and 
this is reflected in the rents paid for land as illustrated in Figure1.  This can be seen also in 
Figure 2, which displays the average income per hectare obtained from Pillar 1 subsidies, 
Pillar 2 subsidies and via the market for each year in our sample. Only dairy and tillage farms 
on average earn positive market returns while cattle and sheep farms on average are loss 
making in the absence of subsidies. There is also a clear distinction in the extent to which the 
farms tend to be reliant on subsidies, with tillage farms tending to receive a smaller 
proportion of their incomes from Pillar 2 subsidies. 
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Figure 2. Breakdown of average income per hectare by farm type 
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Figure 3 indicates considerable inertia in land rental rates in Ireland despite the ‘conacre’ 
system of short-term rental contracts, if there were complete inertia, rents would lie along the 
black 45° line when plotted against the previous year’s rent. The degree of inertia in land 
rents appears similar in both the pre- and post-decoupling periods.1 Thus a dynamic model 
appears warranted.  
Figure 3. Evidence of inertia in rental rates 
 
Table 1 presents the results for the pre- and post-decoupling periods using the two-step 
System-GMM estimator applying the Windmeijer correction for small sample bias and a full 
set of year dummies. Specifications including additional control variables such as the percent 
of land used for crops and pasture, the percent of farm labour that is paid and soil quality 
were estimated but these variables were insignificant and hence were excluded from the final 
analysis. The Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests reveal that although there is first order 
serial correlation, there is not second order serial correlation which would invalidate our 
estimates. Hansen tests for the validity of instruments, also reported in Table 1, suggest that 
the instruments are exogenous as required. The Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests reveal 
that although there is first order serial correlation, there is not second order serial correlation 
which would invalidate our estimates. Hansen tests for the validity of instruments, also 
reported in Table 1, suggest that the instruments are exogenous as required. 
Table 1. Two-step Robust System GMM for pre-decoupling and post-decoupling periods 
  Dairying Cattle Sheep Tillage 
Pre-decoupling         
Lagged Rent per hectare 0.811*** 0.886*** 0.620*** 0.646*** 
  (0.056) (0.063) (0.123) (0.089) 
Market Income per hectare 0.056** 0.059 0.069 0.048 
  (0.025) (0.042) (0.057) (0.049) 
                                                        
1 The inertia of the explanatory variables is illustrated in Figures A4 to A6 in the appendix. 
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Pillar 1 payments per hectare 0.145** 0.061 0.254*** 0.316*** 
  (0.069) (0.052) (0.097) (0.091) 
Pillar 2 payments per hectare 0.103 0.163 -0.012 -0.069 
  (0.068) (0.120) (0.123) (0.109) 
Post-Decoupling         
Lagged Rent per hectare 0.700*** 0.645*** 0.735*** 0.522*** 
  (0.069) (0.088) (0.129) (0.137) 
Market Income per hectare 0.027 -0.083* -0.041 0.040 
  (0.025) (0.045) (0.085) (0.035) 
Pillar 1 payments per hectare 0.122*** 0.074* 0.092 0.252** 
  (0.045) (0.040) (0.086) (0.117) 
Pillar 2 payments per hectare 0.129 0.073 0.045 0.091 
  (0.088) (0.098) (0.110) (0.156) 
Statistical tests:         
Pre-Decoupling         
Hansen p-value 0.550 0.552 0.405 0.642 
AR(1) p-value 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.037** 0.022** 
AR(2) p-value 0.454 0.267 0.124 0.782 
Post-Decoupling         
Hansen p-value 0.112 0.361 0.371 0.141 
AR(1) p-value 0.0001*** 0.019** 0.055* 0.006*** 
AR(2) p-value 0.540 0.358 0.725 0.265 
* = Significant at 10%, ** = Significant at 5%,  *** = Significant at 1%.  
All models include a full set of Year dummies and are estimated using the two step System GMM estimator 
with robust standard errors using the 2nd lag as instrumental variables (similar results are obtained if 
deeper lags are included).  
Lagged rents are strongly related to current rents albeit slightly less so following decoupling 
(in line with the inertia indicated in Figure 3). In the pre-decoupling period, approximately 6 
cents per euro of market income is capitalised into land rents for dairy farms in the short 
term which corresponds to approximately 30 cents per euro in the long run. Positive effects 
of market income on agricultural rent levels are found for the other systems but these 
coefficients are not found to be statistically significant. Turning to Pillar 1 payments, area aid 
payments, such as those to tillage farmers, act as a land cost subsidy and hence are expected 
to  lead to greater capitalisation than output subsidies such as those for cattle and sheep 
(Kilian et al, 2012; Alston and James, 2001; Guyomard et al., 2004). Our findings for the pre-
decoupling period are consistent with this hypothesis, for dairy farms 15 cents (77 cents) of 
each euro of payments are capitalised into land rents in the short (long) run. For sheep and 
tillage farms the corresponding figures are 25 cents (67 cents) and 32 cents (89 cents). For 
cattle farms, Pillar 1 payments do not appear to be capitalised into rents in the pre-
decoupling period although this can be attributed to the imprecision of the estimate.  Figure 
4 which graphically presents the estimated long run capitalisation and its corresponding 95% 
confidence interval. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that Pillar 1 payments are fully 
capitalised into land rents. While Pillar 1 payments are heavily capitalised into rents, we can 
reject the null of full capitalisation. Again the imprecision of our estimate for cattle farms is 
apparent with the confidence interval spanning both full capitalisation and also zero 
capitalisation. In the pre-decoupling period, Pillar 2 payments are not capitalised into land 
rents which may in part be due to nature of these payments and the relatively small 
contribution they make to total income per hectare (see Figure 2). For instance one of the 
major components of Pillar 2 payments in Ireland are made under the agri-environmental 
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measure applied in Ireland known as the Rural Environment Protection Scheme (REPS) and 
can only be received on rented land if the farmer can prove that they have rented the land for 
a period in excess of the subsidy program contract period. Given the prevalence of short-term 
“conacre” rental contracts this effectively restricts these payments to owned land in Ireland. 
In the post-decoupling period, we find that market returns for dairy and tillage farms are not 
capitalised into rents but that surprisingly for cattle and sheep farms higher market incomes 
are associated with lower rental rates, albeit insignificantly so in the case of sheep farms. 
Pillar 1 payments remain capitalised into land rents, albeit in most cases slightly less so 
although for Cattle farms capitalisation increases to 7 cents (21 cents) per euro of support in 
the short (long) run.  For dairy farms 12 cents (41 cents) per euro of support and for tillage 
farms 25 cents (53 cents) per euro of support were capitalised in the short (long) run. For 
sheep farms the capitalisation fell to 9 cents (35 cents) and is not significantly different from 
zero. From Figure 4 it can be seen that post-decoupling pillar 1 subsidies are not fully 
capitalised into rents. The results suggest that capitalisation of Pillar 1 subsidies has fallen 
post-decoupling, however, since the confidence intervals pre- and post-decoupling overlap 
for all systems except Tillage we cannot conclusively say that this is the case. This uncertainty 
is primarily to the imprecision of pre-decoupling estimates. 
Figure 4. Long run capitalisation of subsidies pre- and post-decoupling 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
The influence of subsidies on land prices has attracted considerable attention in the literature 
(Phipps, 1984; Featherstone and Baker, 1987; Barnard, et al., 1997; Weersink et al., 1999; 
Shaik et al., 2005 inter alia). More recently attention has focussed on land rental rates (see 
Lence and Mishra, 2003; Roberts et al. 2003; Kirwan, 2009a, 2009b inter alia). This paper 
adds to the burgeoning literature by exploring the extent to which coupled and decoupled 
subsidy payments have been capitalised into land rental rates in Ireland using panel data 
from the Teagasc National Farm Survey for the years 2000 through to 2008, and presents 
evidence that following the Fischler reforms to CAP, the degree to which pillar 1 subsidies are 
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bid into agricultural land rents has declined. This may be explained by the interaction 
between the reforms themselves and the prevailing agricultural rental market custom in 
Ireland, i.e. the conacre short term rental model. The freedom to consolidate entitlement 
values accorded to farmers who in the reference period farmed rented in land would appear 
to reduce the extent to which agricultural subsidies are capitalised into agricultural rents. 
However, this effect was not as dramatic as one might anticipate, in line with the conclusions 
of O’Neill and Hanrahan (2012) who found that the reform did not dramatically influence the 
area rented by farms in Ireland. 
In contrast to existing studies on land rents in the EU, we apply a dynamic model for land 
rents to account for inertia in the land rental market, while also taking account of expectation 
error through the use of a two-step GMM estimation approach. A priori, given the short term 
nature of agricultural land rental contracts in Ireland, one would expect to observe less 
inertia in Irish agricultural rents than in other European countries where longer term rental 
contracts are the norm (Ciaian et al., 2010). However, the estimated coefficient on the lagged 
rents variable ranged from 0.532 to 0.886. These results reveal the importance of accounting 
for inertia in the agricultural land rent-setting process. This inertia may indicate the presence 
of significant search costs when seeking alternative plots to rent or significant transaction 
costs associated with renegotiating existing contracts or those for alternative plots. In Ireland 
land is often rented within the locality of the farm, limiting competition and increasing the 
importance of social relations between the landlord and tenant. 
Given the importance of past rents in determining current rents, it is not surprising that 
other variables are found to play a lesser role. While market income and Pillar 2 payments 
tends to have a weak impact on rental rates, in the pre-decoupling period Pillar 1 subsidies 
for dairy, sheep and tillage farms are found to be heavily capitalised into agricultural land 
rents, with Pillar I subsidy capitalisation rates ranging from 67 to 90 cents per euro of 
subsidies.  Long run capitalisation of agricultural subsidies into agricultural rents is highest 
amongst tillage farms. This system is also in an Irish context the system where the greatest 
proportion of agricultural area farmed is rented-in land. Post-decoupling, we find that Pillar 1 
payments remain capitalised into land rents, albeit in most cases slightly less so than in the 
pre-decoupling period. The estimate long run captialisation rates for each farm type tend to 
be approximately half the rate observed for the pre-decoupling periods.We attribute this 
result to the option for Irish farmers to consolidate their entitlements from rented land where 
the rental contract has expired to other plots of land, reducing the ability of landowners to 
capture these payments. 
The freedom to consolidate SPS entitlements would appear from our results to have, in an 
Irish context, reduced the extent to which subsidies are capitalised into rents. This outcome 
may be peculiar to Ireland, the conacre rental model is only widely used in one other region 
of the EU, Northern Ireland. The prevalence of long term agricultural land rental contracts in 
most EU Member States (Ciaian et al., 2010) means that the ability of farmers (as opposed to 
landlords) in other Member States to capture more of the decoupled agricultural subsidy may 
not have been similarly enhanced by the Fischler reforms. In an Irish context our results 
suggest that the transfer efficiency of agricultural policy has been improved by the 
implementation of the Fischler reforms and particularly the freedom to consolidate SPS 
entitlements that, in the reference period, were “earned” on rented-in land. In an Irish 
context owned, as opposed to rented, land is the dominant form of land tenure. The relative 
unimportance of rented land in total agricultural land use (see Ciaian et al., for comparative 
EU statistics) and very slow rate of structural change in Irish agricultural suggest that in the 
future structural change in Irish agriculture may depend on growth in the share of 
agricultural area that is rented-in.  In the context of the recently agreed reforms to the CAP 
(EC, 2013) that link entitlement to direct income support to control of agricultural land, the 
future transfer efficiency of agricultural policy may be reduced if a mechanism that allows 
farmers to circumvent the capitalisation of subsidies into agricultural rents, such as the 
freedom to consolidate entitlements, is not present. 
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Appendix 
Figure A1. Boxplot of market income per hectare by system 
 
 
Figure A2. Boxplot of pillar 1 subsidies per hectare by system 
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Figure A3. Boxplot of pillar 2 subsidies per hectare by system 
 
 
Figure A4. Evidence of inertia in market income by system 
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Figure A5. Evidence of inertia in Pillar 1 payments by system 
 
Figure A6. Evidence of inertia in Pillar 2 payments by system 
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Figure A7. Boxplot of rent per hectare by system 
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